UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-18-2013

State v. Johnson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40098

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Johnson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40098" (2013). Not Reported. 988.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/988

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

)
)
)
)

NO. 40098
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2011-6495

)

MICHAEL LYNN JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
HONORABLE MELISSA MOODY
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
1.S.B. #6247

(208) 334-4534

BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8712
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................... 5
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 6
I.

The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Denied
Mr. Johnson's Motion For A Mistrial ..................................................................... 6
A. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 6
B. Standard Of Review ........................................................................................ 6
C. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Using The Statement
Regarding Ms. Leonard's Invocation Of The Right To Remain
Silent To Indirectly Comment On Mr. Johnson's Own Silence
And Thereby Have The Jury Infer His Guilt.. ................................................... 7
D. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Here Was Not Harmless Error,
Because The State Will Be Unable To Demonstrate, Beyond
A Reasonable Doubt, That The Prosecutorial Misconduct
Did Not Contribute To The Jury's Guilty Verdict.. .......................................... 15

II. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified
Sentence Of Fifteen Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon
Mr. Johnson Following His Conviction For Felony Possession
Of A Controlled Substance With The Intent To Deliver ....................................... 18
A. Introduction ................................................................................................... 18
B. Standard Of Review ...................................................................................... 18
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed
Mr. Johnson's Sentence Because The Sentence Is
Excessive Considering Any View Of The Facts ............................................ 19

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 22
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ......................................................................................... 23

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) .................................................................... 13
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) .............................................................. 7
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) .............................................................. 7
People v. Cole, 584 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1978) .......................................................... 15
State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685 (1976) ........................................................ 13, 14
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011) ....................................................... passim
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293 (1997) ............................................................. 18
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828 (2011 ) .................................................................. 21
State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950 (Ct. App. 2010) ......................................... 8, 13, 14
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982) ..................................................................... 19
State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722 (2007) ................................................................. 19
State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, _ , 300 P.3d 1046 (2013) ........................... 8, 14
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) .......................................................... 6, 7, 15
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593 (1982) ............................................................. 21
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457 (2002) ................................................................ 18
State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709 (1999) .............................................................. 13
State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764 (Ct. App. 2012) ................................................ 16

Rules
1.C.R. 29.1 (a) ........................................................................................................ 6

iii

Constitutional Provisions
Idaho Const. art. I, § 13 ........................................................................................ 7
U.S. Const.amends. V, XIV .................................................................................. 7

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, forty-five-year-old Michael Lynn Johnson was found guilty of
felony possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

The district court

imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court committed reversible error
when it denied his motion for a mistrial, because the prosecutor used his codefendant's
invocation of the right to remain silent to indirectly comment on his silence and thereby
have the jury infer his guilt. He also asserts that the district court abused its discretion
when it imposed the sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Boise Police Department officers served a search warrant regarding controlled
substances at 4219 W. Bethel Street in Boise.

(Presentence Investigation Report

(hereinafter, PSI), pp.2, 15, Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial Days 1-3, Mar. 26-28,

2012 (hereinafter, Tr.), p.150, Ls.20-22.)

Mr. Johnson's employer owned the house.

(PSI, p.2.) After nobody answered at the front door, the officers entered the house by
using a battering ram to break down the door.

(PSI, pp.2, 15.) The officers found

Amber Leonard inside the house and Jacob Lee just outside the house in the backyard.
(PSI, pp.2, 15.) Both Ms. Leonard and Mr. Lee were handcuffed by the officers. (PSI,
pp.2.) After Ms. Leonard was handcuffed and secured, Officer Will Reimers read her
Miranda 1 rights to her, and she asserted her right to remain silent.

(PSI, p.15,

Tr., p.383, L.2 - p.385, L.2.) Officer Reimers then handed her over to Lieutenant Paul

1

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

1

Burch, who was a sergeant at the time of the search. (PSI, p. 15, Tr., p.394, Ls.11-18.)
Lieutenant Burch later inteNiewed Ms. Leonard, and she waived her Miranda rights and
admitted that she had a purple methamphetamine pipe in her bedroom and marijuana
on her person. (PSI, p.16;

see Tr., p.140, Ls.17-20.)

In Mr. Johnson's bedroom, the officers found pieces of mail with Mr. Johnson's
name on them, a small amount of a white powdery substance, and several
methamphetamine pipes in plain view.

(PSI, pp.2, 14-15, Tr., p.154, L.10 - p.160,

L.24.) In the garage, the officers found a safe. (PSI, p.2.) After the officers opened the
safe with the assistance of firefighters, they found a black nylon zipper bag containing
$380.00 and six baggies of a crystal substance that appeared to be methamphetamine.
(PSI, pp.2, 15-16.) Also inside the safe was a small blue plastic container that held a
white crystal substance consistent with methamphetamine and another bag of a white
crystal substance consistent with methamphetamine.

(PSI, p.16.)

In total, the

suspected methamphetamine in the eight containers had a package weight of
approximately 25.6 grams. (PSI, p.16.)
The safe also contained clean plastic zip-top baggies, a small digital scale, and
two bags containing a total of about 1.8 grams of suspected marijuana. (PSI, p.16.)
Additionally, the officers found Mr. Johnson's birth certificate, his Social Security card,
his certificate of title for a vehicle, and a credit card with his name on it inside the safe.
(PSI, pp.2, 16, Tr., p.391, L.18 - p.392, L.19.) According to Officer Reimers's police
report, "There were no items of indicia 2 belonging to any other person in the safe."

2

An "item of indicia," according to Officer Guy Bourgeau, "is something that identifies
you by virtue of your name. So mail coming to your house would be indicia. It would be
indicative that you live there. It has your name and home address, so we refer to it as
'indicia."' (Tr., p.159, Ls.13-19.)
2

(PSI, p.16.)

However, the officers did not test the contents of the safe (or, for that

matter, anything in the house) for fingerprints. (Tr., p.416, Ls.11-14.) Officer Reimers
testified at trial that the officers did not test the contents of the safe for fingerprints
because "when you have a locked safe with only one person's indicia in it along with
evidence, there is no need to waste the taxpayers' money." (Tr., p.416, Ls.15-19.)
Mr. Johnson was at work when the officers served the search warrant and
conducted their search. (See PSI, p.2.) Officers went to Mr. Johnson's workplace and
arrested him there.

(PSI, p.2.) They then brought Mr. Johnson to the house.

(PSI,

p.2.) Mr. Johnson reportedly admitted that the safe belonged to him, and stated that he
had forgotten the combination. (PSI, p.17.) After Officer Reimers told Mr. Johnson that
the officers had found bags of suspected methamphetamine in the safe, Mr. Johnson
stated that he did not want to talk to Officer Reimers about what was found in the safe,
and that he wanted to talk to his lawyer. (PSI, p.18.)
The white powdery substance found

in

Mr. Johnson's bedroom tested

presumptively positive for amphetamine. (PSI, p.14.) Additionally, samples from each
of the containers of crystal substance found in the safe all tested presumptively positive
for amphetamine.

(PSI, p.16.)

The suspected marijuana from the safe tested

presumptively positive for marijuana. (PSI, p.16.)
Mr. Johnson was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance
with the intent to deliver, felony, Idaho Code § 37-2732(a), one count of possession of
drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, I.C. § 37-2734A, and one count of possession of a
controlled substance, misdemeanor, I.C. § 37-2732(c). 3

(R., pp.7-8, 33-36.)

He

The felony possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver charge was
for the methamphetamine, and the misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance
charge was for the marijuana. (R., p.36.)
3

3

entered a not guilty plea to the charges. (R., p.39.) Mr. Johnson and his codefendant,
Ms. Leonard, had a joint jury trial. (See R., p.60.) After the prosecutor made comments
in his opening statement about Mr. Johnson's assertion of his right to counsel, the
district court granted a mistrial for both Mr. Johnson and Ms. Leonard. (R., pp.61-62.)
Mr. Johnson and Ms. Leonard were subsequently codefendants in a new joint
jury trial. (See R., p.69.) Mr. Johnson did not testify at the trial, while Ms. Leonard
testified during the defense case-in-chief. (R., p.74.) After the prosecution played a
recording during the State's rebuttal that indicated that Ms. Leonard had invoked her
right to remain silent, Ms. Leonard and Mr. Johnson asked for the district court to
declare another mistrial. (Tr., p.515, L.13 - p.517, L.6, p.531, L.22 - p.532, L.9.) The
district court denied the codefendants' motion for a mistral. (Tr., p.548, L.4 - p.549,
L.24.) The jury subsequently found Mr. Johnson guilty on all three counts. (R., p.124.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a unified sentence of fifteen years, with
five years fixed.

(Reporter's Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, May 16, 2012

(hereinafter, Sentencing Tr.), p.7, Ls.15-19.) Mr. Johnson's counsel recommended that

the district court place Mr. Johnson on a Therapeutic Community "rider," or otherwise
impose a lower fixed sentence than that recommended by the State, such as one or two
years fixed. (Sentencing Tr., p.12, L.23 - p.24, L.12.) The district court, for the felony
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver count, imposed a unified
sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed. 4 (R., pp.127-30.)
Mr. Johnson then filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.134-37.)

4

The district court imposed a sentence of sixty-six days in jail for each of the other two
counts, to run concurrently with the felony sentence. (R., p.128.) The district court
gave Mr. Johnson sixty-six days credit for time served. (R., pp.128-29.)
4

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied Mr. Johnson's motion
for a mistrial?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
fifteen years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Johnson following his conviction for
felony possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Denied Mr. Johnson's Motion
For A Mistrial
A.

Introduction
Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court committed reversible error when it

denied his motion for a mistrial.

The prosecutor committed misconduct by playing

during the State's rebuttal a recording of Lieutenant Burch stating that Mr. Johnson's
codefendant Ms. Leonard had invoked her right to remain silent, to indirectly comment
on Mr. Johnson's own invocation of his right to remain silent and thereby have the jury
infer his guilt. The State will be unable to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1, a criminal defendant's motion for a mistrial

may be granted "when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the
proceedings ... which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a
fair trial."

I.C.R. 29.1 (a).

"Where a defendant alleges error at trial that he had

contemporaneously objected to," an appellate court "reviews the error on appeal under
the harmless error test."

State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59 (2011) (citing State v.

Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010)).

"When the alleged error is prosecutorial

misconduct, first the defendant must demonstrate that prosecutorial misconduct
occurred, and then the [appellate court] must declare a belief beyond a reasonable
doubt that the misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict, in order to find that the
error was harmless and not reversible." Id. (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-28). The
6

State "has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable
doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury's verdict." Perry, 150
Idaho at 227.
Here, Mr. Johnson's counsel contemporaneously objected to the prosecutor's
comments as prosecutorial misconduct and made a motion for mistrial based upon that
objection.

(Tr., p.531, L.22 - p.532, L.9.)

Thus, this Court should determine

(1) whether there was any prosecutorial misconduct, and (2) if so, whether the error
was harmless.

C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Using The Statement Regarding
Ms. Leonard's Invocation Of The Right To Remain Silent To Indirectly Comment
On Mr. Johnson's Own Silence And Thereby Have The Jury Infer His Guilt
Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution

and Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, no criminal defendant may be
compelled to testify against himself or herself.

U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV, Idaho

Const. art. I,§ 13. Thus, suspects in criminal cases have a constitutional right to remain
silent. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-69 (1966) (holding that, under certain
circumstances, a criminal suspect must "be informed in clear and unequivocal terms
that he has the right to remain silent").
Further, this right bars the prosecution from commenting on a defendant's postMiranda invocation of the right to remain silent. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-

19 (1976), Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965). As the Idaho Supreme
Court has recognized, "because of the promise present in a Miranda warning, a
prosecutor may not use evidence of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for either
impeachment, Doyle v. Ohio, [426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976)], or as substantive evidence of
guilt in the State's case-in chief, Wainwright v. Greenfield, [474 U.S. 284, 292 (1986)]."

7

Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60. Representatives of the State, such as police officers, have

the same duty as prosecutors not to improperly comment on a defendant's silence. Id.
at 61. However, "(a] prosecutor may use evidence of pre-Miranda silence, either pre- or
post-arrest, for impeachment of the defendant." Id. at 60.
Thus, Idaho's appellate courts have consistently held that a prosecutor commits
misconduct by commenting on a defendant's post-Miranda silence, because such
comments run the risk that the jury will infer the defendant's guilt from his or her
exercise of the constitutional right to remain silent. E.g., State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558,
_ , 300 P.3d 1046, 1055-56 (2013) (holding that a prosecutor violated a defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights by commenting on the defendant's post-Miranda silence during
the prosecutor's closing argument), Ellington, 151 Idaho at 59-61 (holding that a
prosecutor committed misconduct by commenting on a defendant's post-arrest silence
through the questioning of a detective witness during the State's case-in-chief), State

v.

Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 960 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a prosecutor's question to a

defendant during cross-examination as whether the defendant "waited until you got your
chance here to listen to all the witnesses and then tell your story" violated the
defendant's right to remain silent).
Mr. Johnson submits that the prosecutor here also committed misconduct by
commenting on a defendant's post-Miranda silence. Following Ms. Leonard's testimony
for the defense at the trial, the prosecutor proposed playing during the State's rebuttal a
redacted audio recording of Ms. Leonard's interview with Lieutenant Burch. (Tr., p.481,
L.12 - p.482, L.10.)

After Lieutenant Burch laid foundation for the recording, the

prosecution published the recording to the jury. (Tr., p.511, L.8 - p.514, L.14.) The
recording included the following exchange:
8

[LIEUTENANT BURCH:] Here is the thing: The charges that you are
looking at only - I mean, there's a meth pipe back in your room. There is
some weed out in the garage and paraphernalia everywhere. You talked
to Officer Reimers. Okay. I would rather not charge you with a bunch of
stuff that isn't really - that's yours. And I know you said to him that you
didn't want to answer questions. I think you're straight-up enough AMBER LEONARD: Right.
[LIEUTENANT BURCH:] - I would like to ask you what's yours and what's
not yours.
(Tr., p. 515, L. 13 - p. 516, L. 1.)
Ms. Leonard's counsel immediately asked to pause the recording and, outside
the presence of the jury, requested a mistrial on the grounds of prosecutorial
misconduct. (Tr., p.516, L.2 - p.517, L.6.) The prosecutor responded to Ms. Leonard's
motion for a mistrial by arguing that Ms. Leonard had voluntarily made statements to
Lieutenant Burch after being given her Miranda rights and re-approached. (Tr., p.524,
L.7 - p.526, L.21.)

The district court determined that the comments regarding

Ms. Leonard's assertion of the right to remain silent were not being used as evidence of
guilt, and that Ms. Leonard had waived her right to remain silent by testifying at trial and
thus opened her testimony to impeachment.

(Tr., p.528, L.25 - p.529, L.20.)

The

district court therefore denied the motion for a mistrial. (Tr., p.529, Ls.19-20.)
Mr. Johnson's counsel then informed the district court that he wanted to join the
motion for a mistrial. (Tr., p.531, Ls.22-24.) Counsel for Mr. Johnson believed that "an
undue prejudice" had also arisen towards Mr. Johnson, because "Ms. Leonard has
testified as to facts that relate directly to Mr. Johnson." (Tr., p.531, L.24 - p.532, L.3.)
Mr. Johnson's counsel was concerned "that somehow is [Ms. Leonard's] silence now
going to be imputed to my client. The issue that we have here is I have got - my client
has asserted his right to remain silent." (Tr., p.532, Ls.4-9.)
9

The district court stated that it planned to instruct the prosecutor "not to make any
reference to the fact that the search warrant was issued by a judge upon probable
cause in front of the jury, not to make any comment about this part of the tape at all in
front of the jury." (Tr., p.534, L.23 - p.535, L.4.) The district court also asked counsel
for the defendants "not to make any comment about this particular part of the tape in
front of the jury." (Tr., p.535, Ls.5-7.) Before taking a recess, the district court asked
the prosecutor to redact the part of the recording commenting on Ms. Leonard's
assertion of the right to remain silent, remarking, "And as I said before, frankly, I'm
amazed that you left it in there, knowing the history of this case." (Tr., p.535, Ls.19-23.)
After the recess, Mr. Johnson's counsel told the court, "So my client is now left
with exercising his right to remain silent because we have rested. There is testimony in
the record that infers guilt from exercising your right to remain silent. So we are in a
position where I do believe that it is prejudicial." (Tr., p.543, Ls.1-6.) In response, the
district court advised that it would "tell the jury [in the instructions] that you've got a right
to remain silent, and they can't draw any negative inference from the fact that one does
remain silent. And I think that probably takes care of it for Mr. Johnson's case because
there has actually been no comment by anybody about him remaining silent."
(Tr., p.543, Ls.7-14.) The district court additionally stated that Ms. Leonard's issue was
different, and that "she clearly has waived her right to remain silent by testifying here."
(Tr., p.543, Ls.15-17.)
After further argument from counsel, the district court commented that "I don't
know why this wasn't redacted, and I haven't heard any reason for it." (Tr., p.548,
Ls.11-12.) However, the district court also did not "think this discussion is relevant. And
I am intending to give the instruction to the jury that they can't draw any inference
10

regarding that." (Tr., p.548, Ls.13-17.) The district court stated, "I'm not convinced that
the jury is going to even pay any attention to it in the way it came up in this case."
(Tr., p.548, Ls.20-22.) "[T]his is being played as rebuttal for Ms. Leonard's testimony
here in court. And what the concern is, with the comments on the Defendants' silence,
is that the jury will conclude that they're guilty. That's a tough case to make where the
defendant [Ms. Leonard] has voluntarily testified at trial." (Tr., p.548, L.25 - p.549, L.6.)
While the district court understood "that the rights of the defendants are very
significant," it thought "that any chance of prejudice is so slight, that it really does not
deserve the granting of a mistrial and teeing this up all over again." (Tr., p.549, Ls.1520.)

Thus, the district court ultimately denied the motion for a mistrial.

(Tr., p.549,

L.21.) As part of the written jury instructions, the district court instructed the jury as
follows: "You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant does
not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in
any way." (R., p.115;

see Tr., p.663, Ls.9-17.)

Mr. Johnson asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by using
Lieutenant Burch's statement regarding Ms. Leonard's invocation of the right to remain
silent to indirectly comment on Mr. Johnson's own silence and thereby have the jury
infer his guilt. As a preliminary matter, the prosecutor was not permitted to comment on
Ms. Leonard's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence. While the district court stated that it
did not remember whether Officer Reimers testified that he had given Ms. Leonard her
Miranda rights before Lieutenant Burch interviewed her (Tr., p.530, Ls.21-23), Officer

Reimers actually read Ms. Leonard her Miranda rights before the interview (Tr., p.309,
Ls.8-10, p.384, L.25 - p.385, L.2, p.394, Ls.11-18).

11

Thus, the prosecutor was not permitted to introduce Lieutenant Burch's
statement on Ms. Leonard's silence during the State's rebuttal, because her silence was
post-arrest and post-Miranda. Mr. Johnson submits that, just as "a prosecutor may not
use evidence of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for either impeachment, or as
substantive evidence of guilt in the State's case-in chief," Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60
(citations omitted), or in the State's closing argument, Parton, 154 Idaho 558, a
prosecutor may not use such evidence during the State's rebuttal. The constitutional
protection barring the prosecutor from using such comments applies during the State's
rebuttal, because comments on a defendant's post-Miranda silence also run the risk
that the jury will infer the defendant's guilt from his or her exercise of the constitutional
right to remain silent. The prosecutor here was therefore not permitted to use evidence
of Ms. Leonard's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes or as
substantive evidence of guilt. 5

Because the prosecutor was not permitted to use

Lieutenant Burch's statement regarding

Ms. Leonard's silence,

the prosecutor

committed misconduct.
Additionally, the district court incorrectly denied the motion for a mistrial, in part,
because it determined that Ms. Leonard "has clearly waived her right to silence by
testifying here at this trial." (Tr., p.529, Ls.16-18, p.543, Ls.15-17.) However, Idaho's
appellate courts have held that a prosecutor commits misconduct through commenting
on a defendant's post-Miranda silence even in cases where the defendant testified at

Even if Ms. Leonard's silence had been pre-Miranda, the Idaho Supreme Court "has
held that a defendant's right to remain silent attaches upon custody, not arrest or
interrogation, and thus a prosecutor may not use any post-custody silence to infer guilt
in its case-in-chief." Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60. Thus, if Ms. Leonard's silence had
been pre-Miranda, the prosecutor would have been permitted to use her silence only for
impeachment. See id.
5

12

trial.

See, e.g., State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 711-14 (1999) (holding that a

prosecutor improperly used

a defendant's post-Miranda silence during

cross-

examination and closing argument in violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent), Molen, 148 Idaho at 958, 960.

No authority supports the district

court's conclusion that a defendant, by testifying at trial, gives up the constitutional
protection barring a prosecutor from using the defendant's post-Miranda silence. See
Doyle, 426 U.S. at 613-14, 619-20.

Thus, the district court's determination that the

prosecutor could use evidence of Ms. Leonard's post-Miranda silence because she had
testified in her defense was incorrect.
The prosecutor's misconduct in using Lieutenant Burch's statement was
compounded by the fact that the statement's only conceivable use against Ms. Leonard
was as substantive evidence of her guilt. A criminal defendant who voluntarily testifies
in his or her own behalf puts his credibility in issue, and is subject to impeachment the
same as any other witness. State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 688 (1976). A witness
may be impeached by showing that on a prior occasion the witness made a statement
inconsistent with testimony he or she gave at trial. Id. Here, Ms. Leonard testified at
trial that she did not tell the officers that the purple methamphetamine pipe belonged to
her (Tr., p.467, Ls.5-8, p.476, Ls.6-13), and that she knew that Mr. Lee had placed the
black zipper bag in the safe (Tr., p.461, L.17 - p.462, L.5).

The recording of the

interview included statements by Ms. Leonard that were inconsistent with her testimony
about the purple methamphetamine pipe (Tr., p.646, Ls.4-21), and about her knowledge
of the contents of the safe (Tr., p.640, Ls.9-21).
However, Lieutenant Burch's statement regarding Ms. Leonard's invocation of
the right to remain silent was not inconsistent with any of Ms. Leonard's trial testimony.
13

Because Lieutenant Burch's statement was not inconsistent with Ms. Leonard's
testimony, it could not have been used for impeachment purposes. See Drapeau, 97
Idaho at 688. Indeed, the district court indicated that Lieutenant Burch's statement was
not being used for impeachment purposes at during the discussion. When the district
court initially denied Ms. Leonard's motion for a mistrial, it observed, "I don't think the
evidence here is really being used for anything."6 (Tr., p.529, Ls.6-7.) The district court
later stated, "I'm not sure this particular statement is part of the impeachment."
(Tr., p.531, Ls.15-16.)

Thus, the only conceivable use of Lieutenant's Burch's

statement against Ms. Leonard was as substantive evidence of her guilt.
In light of the above, Mr. Johnson asserts that the prosecutor committed
misconduct by using Lieutenant Burch's statement regarding Ms. Leonard's invocation
of the right to remain silent to indirectly comment on Mr. Johnson's own silence and
thereby have the jury infer his guilt. While the district court remarked that "there has
actually been no comment by anybody about [Mr. Johnson] remaining silent" (Tr., p.543,
Ls.13-14), Mr. Johnson's counsel was concerned that Ms. Johnson's silence "would
somehow be imputed to my client" (Tr., p.532, Ls.4-7). Additionally, Mr. Johnson did
not testify at the trial, and so did not open the door for impeachment by the prosecution.
See Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 688.

With impeachment not an option, the prosecutor's

indirect comment on Mr. Johnson's assertion of the right to remain silent implied that
Mr. Johnson was guilty. Because Lieutenant Burch's statement could only conceivably

The district court also stated, "I don't think the statement that's been objected to on
this tape is being used as evidence of guilt." (Tr., p.529, Ls.8-10.) However, the district
court seemingly ignored the Idaho appellate cases holding that comments such as
Lieutenant Burch's statement constitute misconduct because they run the risk that the
jury will infer the defendant's guilt from his or her exercise of the constitutional right to
remain silent. See, e.g., Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 300 P.3d at 1055-56, Ellington, 151
Idaho at 59-61, Molen, 148 Idaho at 960.
6
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have been used against Ms. Leonard as substantive evidence of her guilt, it follows that
the evidence of Ms. Leonard's assertion of the right to remain silent would imply that
Ms. Leonard was guilty and transfer that guilt to Mr. Johnson. See People v. Cole, 584
P.2d 71, 73 (Colo. 1978) ("A danger inherent in permitting the prosecutor to impeach a
witness allegedly involved in the same criminal transaction as the defendant with his
post-arrest silence is that the jury will infer guilt on the part of the witness and transfer
that guilt to the defendant.") Thus, the prosecutor committed misconduct by indirectly
commenting on Mr. Johnson's silence to imply that he was guilty.

D.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Here Was Not Harmless Error, Because The State
Will Be Unable To Demonstrate, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That The
Prosecutorial Misconduct Did Not Contribute To The Jury's Guilty Verdict
Mr. Johnson asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct here was not harmless

error because the State will be unable to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the misconduct did not contribute to the jury's guilty verdict. As discussed above, if the
defendant demonstrates that prosecutorial misconduct occurred, the appellate court
"must declare a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct did not contribute
to the jury's verdict, in order to find that the error was harmless and not reversible."
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 59 (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-28). The State has the burden

of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the misconduct did not contribute to
the jury's verdict. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
Here, the State will be unable to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
prosecutorial misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict. While the district court
stated, "I'm not convinced that the jury is going to even pay any attention to it in the way
it came up in this case" (Tr., p.548, Ls.20-22), the facts of this case show the impact of
Lieutenant Burch's statement.

This is not a case where the prosecution presented
15

overwhelming evidence of Mr. Johnson's guilt. Although Mr. Johnson told the officers
that the safe was his, and Mr. Johnson's items of indicia were found in the safe, that
evidence does not establish Mr. Johnson's guilt.

No fingerprint evidence connected

Mr. Johnson to the methamphetamine found in the safe.

In fact, the officers utterly

failed to test anything in the safe or in the house for fingerprints, ostensibly to save
money.

(Tr., p.416, Ls.11-19.) Additionally, Ms. Leonard testified that Mr. Lee had

"regular access" to the safe (Tr., p.457, L.16 - p.458, L.1 ), and that he placed the black
zipper bag in the safe (Tr., p.461, L.17 - p.462, l.5). The above facts highlight the
overall weakness of the evidence against Mr. Johnson. Thus, the prosecutor's indirect
comment on Mr. Johnson's assertion of the right to remain silent, as evidence of his
substantive guilt, likely contributed to the jury's guilty verdict.
Further, Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court's curative instruction was
insufficient.

While appellate courts "normally presume that a jury will follow an

instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence, this presumption cannot shield all errors
from appellate review, regardless of the severity of the error or the forcefulness and
effectiveness of the instruction." State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2012).
"[W]here the evidence presents a close question for the jury, a corrective instruction,
even one that is forceful, might be insufficient to cure the prejudicial effect of very
damaging evidence." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
As discussed above, the written jury instructions included the following
instruction:
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled
to testify. The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting
with the advice and assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not
draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant does not
testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your
deliberations in any way.
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(R., p.115;

see Tr., p.663, Ls.9-17.)

Because the evidence here presented a close question for the jury, the district
court's curative instruction was insufficient to cure the prejudicial effect of the indirect
comment on Mr. Johnson's invocation of the right to remain silent. As discussed above,
this is not a case where the prosecution presented overwhelming evidence of
Mr. Johnson's guilt.

Considering the overall weakness of the evidence against

Mr. Johnson, the indirect comment on his assertion of the right to remain silent, which
implied his guilt, affected the jury's guilty verdict.

Further, the curative instruction

focused on the right to remain silent during trial, while Ms. Leonard's silence occurred
during interrogation.

Thus, the district court's curative instruction was insufficient to

cure the prejudicial effect of the evidence of Ms. Leonard's invocation of the right to
remain silent.
In sum, the prosecutor's indirect comment on Mr. Johnson's assertion of the right
to remain silent contributed to the jury's guilty verdict because of the overall weakness
of the evidence against Mr. Johnson, and the district court's curative instruction was
insufficient to cure the indirect comment's prejudicial effect.

Thus, the State will be

unable to be unable to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutorial
misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict.
Because the prosecutor committed misconduct and the misconduct was not
harmless error, the district court should have granted Mr. Johnson's motion for a
mistrial.

The district court therefore committed reversible error when it denied the

motion for a mistrial. Mr. Johnson should be granted a new trial.
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11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Fifteen
Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Johnson Following His Conviction For Felony
Possession Of A Controlled Substance With The Intent To Deliver

A.

Introduction
Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed

his sentence because his unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed, is
excessive considering any view of the facts.

B.

Standard Of Review
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively

harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving "due regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence." State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Mr. Johnson does not allege that his sentence exceeds the
statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Johnson
must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive
considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal
punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.

Id. An appellate court, "[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence ...

consider[s] the defendant's entire sentence."
18

State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726

(2007). The reviewing court will "presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be
the defendant's probable term of confinement." Id.

C.

The
District
Court
Abused
Its
Discretion
When
It
Imposed
Mr. Johnson's Sentence Because The Sentence Is Excessive Considering Any
View Of The Facts
Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed

his sentence because the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. He
submits that the sentence imposed by the district court is excessive considering any
view of the facts because the district court did not give adequate consideration to
mitigating factors.
Specifically, the district court did not adequately consider the evidence of
Mr. Johnson's physical health. Mr. Johnson informed the presentence investigator that
he "suffers from frequent headaches."

(PSI, p.4.)

Mr. Johnson's mother, Sharla

Worthen, described the headaches in a letter to the district court: "Michael has extreme,
chronic, debilitating headaches. Oftentimes he would be in bed all weekend. Being a
drug addict, doctors do not prescribe [him] painkillers. Having suffered with migraines
my whole life, you just want to give up and die." (PSI, p.26.) Adequate consideration of
Mr. Johnson's physical health should have resulted in a lesser sentence.
Additionally, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Johnson's
substance abuse problems.

The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized substance

abuse as a mitigating factor in cases where it found a sentence to be excessive. See,
e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). Mr. Johnson has struggled with substance

abuse problems for much of his life. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Johnson's counsel
told the district court that Mr. Johnson had "a significant drug issue."

(Sentencing

Tr., p.11, Ls.10-12.) Mr. Johnson described methamphetamine as his drug of choice.
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(PSI, pp.4-5.) In the presentence questionnaire, he scored a six out of nine on the TCU
drug-screening form. (PSI, p.5.) "Score values of 3 or greater indicate relatively severe
drug-related problems, and correspond approximately to a DSM drug dependence
diagnosis." (PSI, p.5.)
Along with the instant offenses, he was convicted of felony non-narcotic drug
possession in 1996 and felony possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver in 1991. (PSI, pp.2-3.) Mr. Johnson reported he was using drugs "the whole
time" he was on probation for the 1991 conviction.

(PSI, pp.2-3.) In fact, the 1996

conviction was for a violation of his probation for the 1991 conviction. (PSI, pp.2-3.)
As detailed in letters to the district court from his family, Mr. Johnson's problems
with drugs stem from his childhood. His mother, Ms. Worthen, wrote that Mr. Johnson
was placed on Ritalin after he was diagnosed with ADD in the first grade. (PSI, p.24.)
The diagnosing doctor indicated that the "downside of Ritalin was drug and alcohol
addiction, stomach problems, and headaches." (PSI, p.25.) According to Ms. Worthen,
the Ritalin changed Mr. Johnson "from an energetic, ambitious, curious little 6-year-old
to a lazy, unenergetic little person." (PSI, p.25.) She continued: "Research regarding
Ritalin reveals the impact on children using Ritalin ... significant long term effect[s]
such as depression, committing suicide, lack of coping skills, long term medical effects
such as strokes, heart, and ulcers." (PSI, p.26.)
Mr. Johnson's father, Robert Johnson, told the court that Mr. Johnson "has
struggled so much through the years with his drug addiction - I had hoped it was behind
him and I still have hope that it will be."

(PSI, p.28.)

His younger brother, Mark

Johnson, himself a self-described "person of addictive behaviors," also described
Mr. Johnson's problems: "Divorce, neglect, Ritalin, use and abuse of narcotics to name
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a few. My mother can't keep from crying whenever we speak about that Ritalin he was
prescribed as a child." (PSI, p.30.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Johnson's substance
abuse problems should have resulted in a lesser sentence.
The district court also did not give adequate consideration to Mr. Johnson's
family support. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized support from the defendant's
family as a mitigating factor where the court decided that a sentence was excessive.

State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); see State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 835
(2011 ). As discussed above, Mr. Johnson's mother, father and brother all wrote letters
to the district court in support of Mr. Johnson.

(PSI, pp.24-28, 30.)

Additionally,

Mr. Johnson's step-father, sister, and brother-in-law wrote letters in support.

(PSI,

pp.29, 31-33.) Mr. Johnson's step-father, Scott Worthen, wrote, "I can promise whoever
might see this that Michael will continue to have enduring and love-driven support from
all of us, regardless and unconditionally." (PSI, p.29.) "The more he can be exposed to
the support and positive aspects of those who are closest to him, the more likely he is to
commit to a long-term, even permanent, life of sobriety, and leave his demons in the
past." (PSI, p.29.) His brother-in-law, Tyler Woodland, wrote, "We sincerely hope that
whatever Mike's penance is, that it takes him away from his valued family relationships
for only a very short time." (PSI, p.33.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Johnson's counsel informed the district court that
"Mr. Johnson does have family here to support him. His mom's here, his brother's here,
sister; I haven't met his sister. But he does have some support." (Sentencing Tr., p.11,
L.24 - p.12, L.2.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Johnson's family support should have
resulted in a lesser sentence.
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Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating
factors, Mr. Johnson's sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. Thus,
the district court abused its discretion when it imposed the sentence. Mr. Johnson's
sentence should be reduced.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court vacate
his conviction and sentence, and remand his case to the district court for a new trial.
Alternatively, Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems

appropriate,

or

remand

his

case

to

the

district

court

for

sentencing hearing.
DATED this 18th day of June, 2013.
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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